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It is commonplace  to  note  that the  transitions to  market  economies  in  Central  and
Eastern  Europe  have  been  far  more  difficult,  involving  much  greater  personal
hardship and disappointment,  and are taking much  longer than  generally anticipated.
The difficulties and trauma have varied from  country to country, but  in  no country  has
there  been  an  absence  of disarray and  hardship.  Those  who  were  elated  that  the
dictatorial  and socialized systems were to be replaced  by democratic  institutions  and
market  economies  and  who  held optimistic expectations  concerning  the  speed  and
ease with which the transitions would be accomplished  must  now recognize  that we
were guided more  by wishes than by a sense of reality.
We were  all too willing to  assume that the evident euphoria  of those  responsible for
the demise of the old  system  in  Central  Europe  would result  in quick agreement  on
the  steps  that  should  be  taken  to  create  democratic  systems  in  countries  where
democracy  had  never  existed  or,  at  most,  had  a  very  short  history.  And  once
democratic  governments  were  in  place,  relatively  prompt  agreement  would  be
reached  concerning  the  structure  of  laws  and  institutions  required  for  market
economies,  or  so  we thought.  We  permitted  ourselves  to  be  misled  because  the
dissolution of the old systems  had occurred with the near absence  of bloodshed  and,
by romantic  descriptions,  such  as the  "Velvet Revolution", of the  process  by  which
old political and economic systems collapsed and new ones were to emerge.  True, it
was  most remarkable that a world superpower would  simply disappear with  hardly  a
shot being fired and with  its enormous army simply standing aside.
But  it wasn't only in the USSR that governments fell with little or no use of force;  very
little  force  was  involved  in  the  governmental  and  institutional  changes  in  Central
Europe.  There  are  few  if any other examples  in  history  in  which such  political  and
economic transformations - one might say revolutions  - occurred with  so  little use  of
force.
Alas,  participants and  observers  alike  greatly  underestimated  the  complexity  of the
tasks that had  to be tackled to create the conditions simultaneously required for both
democratic institutions and market  economies.  It is now evident, as well, that  there
were very few who  understood the enormous  importance of laws and  governmental
institutions  in  creating  and  maintaining  an  efficient  market  economy.  A  market
economy  must  be  supported  by a  broad  range  of governmental  functions,  such  as
enforcement  of  contracts,  procedures  for  settling  disputes,  providing  security  of
property  rights,  creation  of  infrastructure  (roads,  communication,  schools),  and  to
support  competitive  sectors, such  as agriculture,  it  needs to  have  an  active role  in
such  areas  as  research  and  the  supply  of  information  (Johnson  1995).  In  some
countries,  for  a time,  it was  believed  that  all  that  was  needed  to  create  a  market
economy was to abolish all of the hated  regulations and institutions of the  old system
and the  market  would  emerge  and take  care  of everything.  But,  alas,  it  was  soon
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institutional setting.  Unfortunately,  it has proved remarkably difficult  to agree on what
laws and institutions are required for a market system and to then enact them.
The transition from  the socialist planned system to  a market economy  was generally
agreed  by  domestic  reformers  and  outside  advisers  to  include  two  primary
transformations  - liberalization  of  markets  and  privatization.  The  liberalization  of
markets  was  to  include  a  wide  range  of  markets  - foreign  exchange,  credit,
commodities  and  resources,  such  as  land  and  other  physical  assets.  Privatization
implied  the transfer of nearly all the  state owned  assets used  in  ordinary  productive
economic activities to either new corporate entities or to individuals.
Liberalization
Liberalization  as  prescribed  by an  adviser  seems simple  enough  - eliminate  direct
governmental  intervention  in  domestic  prices,  the  interest  rate,  the  allocation  of
credit,  international  trade  and  the  exchange  rate  reserving  for  the  government  a
limited  number  of functions such  as national  security, the  provision  of  public  goods
and  the maintenance  of law and  order.  All this,  of course, was to  be accomplished
within  a  democratic  framework,  based  on  consensus  achieved  after  appropriate
discussion.  While  it  was  recognized  that  liberalization  would  result  in  gainers  and
losers  -probably  far  more  losers  than  gainers  - I  don't  believe  that  there  was
sufficient recognition  that, for those who  have lived their lives  in a planned  economy,
that markets are  very strange and forbidding  institutions.  Throughout their  lives they
had  been  taught  that  markets  and  the  associated  capitalism  resulted  in  the
exploitation of the worker and the enrichment of a few and failed  to provide for all that
was necessary for a humane society.  But the problem was even greater than distrust
- there were few who had any understanding of how markets functioned.
The  actual  liberalizations that  occurred  in  Russia  and  other  republics  of the  former
Soviet Union bore out the worst expectations.
There  have  been  numerous  failures  of the West  in  assisting  the transition  process
but  perhaps  the  most  important  was  the  failure  to  emphasize  the  enormous
importance  of developing the  legal and  institutional framework to  provide the  public
goods a market economy requires.  While there may be disagreement concerning the
exact  scope  of that role,  there  should  be  no  disagreement  that  provisions for  clear
definitions  of  property  rights,  provisions  for  the  enforcement  of  contracts,  the
assurance  of  civil  liberties,  limitations  on  the  arbitrary  exercise  of  power  by
bureaucracies, and governmental responsibility for the infrastructure  are essential for
an  efficient  market  system.  Actually  the  prescription  for  establishing  a  market
economy,  once  the  appropriate  legal  and  institutional  setting  has  been  created,  is
really  quite  simple  - it  consists  primarily  of  removing  the  enormous  range  of
constraints on individual behavior that existed under the old system.  The difficult part
has been finding the proper role for government.
Privatization
Privatization  is  not  a  magic  pill  that  will  transform  an  economy.  It  is  but  one
component  - one  policy element  - of a set  of coherent  policies  that can facilitate  the
transition of a planned  economy  to a productive market economy.  Adam  Smith taught
us that policies do matter  - "Nations  tolerably well  advanced as to skill, dexterity, and
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general conduct or direction of it;  and those plans have not  all been equally favorable
to the greatness of the product" (Smith  1937,  p. lix).
Privatization  will  not  have  the  anticipated  positive  effects  on  incentives  and
organization of production  unless it is a  part of general  policy  of liberalization  and the
existence  of  laws  and  institutions  required  for  the  effective  function  of  a  market
economy.  The experience of Poland's agriculture  in the  socialist  period  should  have
caused  us  to  question  how  much  privatization  of land,  by  itself,  could  contribute  to
efficient  use  of  resources  and  the  prosperity  of  farming.  Approximately  three
quarters of the farm  land  of Poland remained  in  private hands  but  its  agriculture  did
not achieve a  more  rapid  rate  of growth  of output  for the  period  from,  say,  1950  to
1990,  than that of other Central  European countries.  In fact, the overall  growth  rate of
Polish gross  agricultural  output was  approximately  the  average  for  Central  Europe
but  was  probably  below  the  average  for  the  growth  of  net  production  due  to  the
dependence on large imports  of grain during the 1970s and  1980s.  The estimates  of
gross  agricultural  output did  not factor  out the  large  grain  imports  thus  resulting  in
overcounting.  Privatization  by  itself  cannot  overcome  the  consequences  of
misdirected  policies,  such  as  limited  access  to  inputs,  markets  controlled  by
monopsonies,  restraints  on  buying  and  selling  of  land.  The  instability  of  policies,
including the unwillingness of the government to abandon  its  objective  of completing
the  socialization of land,  added to the  poor performance  in  the  rest  of the economy
(Johnson 1981,  p. 186).
Privatization in a supportive policy atmosphere  can be a powerful force  in agricultural
development  but  it  is  not  enough  to  offset  the  adverse  effects  of  the  set  of
inappropriate  policies such  as prevailed  in  Poland  or now,  unfortunately,  in  much  of
the  former  Soviet  Union.  The  transfer  of  title  from  the  state  to  a  private  entity
constitutes privatization but by itself few or no benefits  are likely  to be  realized.  For
example,  if the  new entities  are  neither  permitted  nor forced  to  go  bankrupt  if they
incur  financial  losses  and  cannot  meet  their  obligations,  then  the  effect  of
privatization  is likely to be nil.  And  this seems to  have been  the fact with  respect to
the types of privatization  carried  out in  the  FSU  except  for the  Baltic  Republics  and
even there the case  is somewhat  mixed.  If titles are  not actually  issued,  are issued
very slowly, and property can only be inherited but not freely sold, important functions
of property ownership  will  not  be  available,  such as  using  land  or other  property  as
collateral  for  loans.  Consequently  the  positive  role  of  agricultural  credit  will  be
greatly circumscribed.  Where ownership  is subject to considerable  restraints by local
authorities, privatization may  not  make all  that much  difference - for example,  if the
local  administration  prevents  reducing  the  labor  force  or  the  export  of  a product
outside the  local jurisdiction or  imposes  price  ceilings for the  benefit  of local  urban
consumers.
Distortions and  resource allocations
Why has  it been so difficult to finish the process of liberalization while achieving the
conditions  for  effective  privatization?  One  reason  is  certainly  that  experience  has
shown  that democratic institutions have seldom  proven themselves to be  efficient in
the use of time.  But  it is  not obvious that given  the enormity  of the tasks involved  in
the transitions that any  other form  of political  organization would  have  been superior.
Certainly  the governmental  structures of the  past were  not  up  to the task  in  Central
and Eastern  Europe - even when  it was  recognized that the socialist economies were
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save even the remnants  of the previous  political and economic  systems.  The  failure
of reforms  in the USSR, for example,  was not for the lack of trying.  Either the system
was  not  reformable  as  Kornai  argues  (1992)  or  the  refomers  didn't  know  what
needed  to  done  as  shown  convincingly  by  Gertrude  E.  Schroeder"s  "The  Soviet
Economy on a Treadmill  of 'Reforms"'  (1979).  Hungary attempted  numerous  reforms
over two decades but failed to significantly alter the basic structure  of its  system.
What  is  now  evident  was  that  the  old  system  had  so  many  and  such  enormous
economic  distortions that  even  under  the  most  promising  circumstances  a  smooth
and  relatively  painless  transition  to  a  market  economy  was  impossible.  The  large
departures  in resource  allocations  in the economy from  what  must  exist  in  a  market
economy  meant that the  required  resource  adjustments  had  to  be  highly  disruptive
and  enormously painful.  Before  turning to the extent  of  the distortions  that  affected
the food and agricultural system,  it must be noted that the macroeconomic  imbalance
created primarily  during the last half of the  1980s and  the first years  of the  1990s  in
the  USSR  added  greatly  to  the  difficulties  and  pain  of  the  transition.  If  price
liberalization  in  1992  had  resulted  in  a  doubling  of  prices  instead  of  a  ten  fold
increase, followed later by increases of several thousand  times,  the transition  would
have gone ahead with far less trauma  and pain.  Given that there were few available
assets that could provide a hedge against inflation, the inflations  that occurred wiped
out the  accumulated  savings  of nearly every  family  in  every  country  of  the  region.
This was  especially tragic for the elderly  but surely adversely  affected  nearly  every
one  except for  the few  who  had  taken  advantage  of opportunities  to  acquire  state
property,  legally or otherwise,  in the very early stages of the reforms.
As  one  means  of visualizing the  disruptions  to  enterprises  and  families  that  have
occurred during the transition,  let us  briefly review some of the major distortions  that
affected agriculture and food as the old systems collapsed in 1990 and  1991:
-Large  consumer subsidies for livestock and poultry products;
-Subsidies for farm  inputs either explicit or indirect through
very low prices for energy;
-Existence of soft budget restraints for many enterprises,
including state and collective farms;
-A banking system that allocated credit on the basis of plans
rather than on profitability of the activity being
financed;
-A very large macroeconomic  imbalance, evidenced  by
shortages at the fixed prices and enormous price
increases when price controls were eliminated;
-Excess demand for food products that permitted the
processing sector to produce and sell products of
limited quality and variety that were not
competitive in international markets;
-Faith in the economies of scale led to large scale
processing plants, with exclusive territories in
which they faced no significant competition for
supplies;
-Direct allocation of farm  inputs to farms  in the socialized
sector, which meant that there did not exist a
marketing  system for farm inputs.
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with the  expected  effects  on  innovation,  productivity,  and  the  quality  and  variety  of
products and services.  The concept that an enterprise was to serve the consumer,  be
it a housewife or a farm,  simply did not exist.
It  is  important  to  understand  the  significance  of  these  distortions  to  the  transition
process,  especially those that had the  greatest  impact on  resource  allocation.  The
existence of large subsidies on  livestock and other food products that ranged from  10
to  12  percent of the gross  national  product of the Soviet  Union  during  1985  to  1991
resulted  in  an  allocation  of agricultural  resources  vastly  different  than  what  would
have  existed  in  a  market  economy  (World  Bank  1992).  Much  of the  pain  of  the
transition process for farmers  has been due to the required changes  in  the allocation
of resources,  the  product  mix,  and  the  scale of output.  Even  if there  had  been  no
declines in  real  per capita incomes  during the transition, the livestock sectors  would
have  been  faced  with  substantial  problems  of  adjustment  as  the  unsustainable
subsidies were  eliminated.  Other  major conditions  have  caused  significant  harm  to
the transition  process,  namely the absence  of certain  institutions,  such  as a banking
system  or a marketing  system  for farm  inputs,  and monopolization  of the processing
sector.
Monopoly in the input and processing sectors  merit special note since the effects will
last for  many years,  at  least  a decade.  What  emerged  from  the  old  system was  a
group  of  enterprises  with  outmoded  equipment  that  will  require  nearly  complete
replacement if they are to adequately serve agriculture and, in  turn, consumers.
Farm  machinery  did  not  meet  the  standards  of  productivity  and  performance  of
machinery available elsewhere.  Central  planners were never able  to solve the  spare
parts  problem,  which  ranks  as one of the  great  unsolved  mysteries  of the  planning
systems.  In  a  system that provided little variety in farm  machinery  and equipment,  it
should  have been  easy for planners  to  determine the  appropriate  mix between  new
machines  and the supply  of spare  parts  - even in  the days  before  computers.  And
among  the  most  insane  of the  regulations  of  the  Soviet  system  was  that  it  was  a
crime  to  cannibalize,  for  example,  a  new  combine  to  repair  several  existing
combines.  The real  crime was that the planners were so  incompetent that they could
not solve the spare parts problem.
It will require several  years and large  investments  before  significant progress  will  be
made  in  producing  machinery that  is  of appropriate  quality, design  and  size for  the
farms  that will emerge  in  the future.  In  the  past,  farm  machinery  was  produced  for
large  farms,  and  nearly  all  of  the  inventory  inherited  from  the  past  consisted  of
machines  ill  adapted  for  family  farms.  This  has  put  the  small  family  farm  at  a
disadvantage.  Whether the farms that emerge  are  large enterprises or family farms,
the future of farming  in the  FSU  will be  that of a modern agriculture with  a relatively
high ratio  of capital  per worker  and with  a large  percentage of its  inputs purchased
from  the nonfarm  sector. The  machinery  and other input  producing  enterprises  that
now exist require enormous change in order to adequately supply the agriculture that
will be competitive in world markets.  The consumer subsidies, primarily for livestock
products,  were  put first on  the  list of  distortions  because  of  the  large  and  painful
adjustments  required  in meat  and milk production,  as the subsidies were  eliminated.
In  1989 consumers  paid  no  more  than  a third  of the  cost of meat  and  milk  in  retail
stores  (World  Bank  1992,  p.  219).  It has  never  been  obvious  to  me  why  policy
makers  in the USSR had  such a fetish over meat unless they believed  that it was one
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have followed  Engels and not Engel  in making their decision  - Engel  would  have told
them  that  in  a growing  economy  it was  dangerous  to  fix the  price  in nominal  terms
and then subsidize it, if the income elasticity of demand were equal to or greater than
one.  But this is exactly what was done with  meat and  milk from  1963 through  1990.
Even  with  large subsidies Soviet agriculture could not meet the growth  in the annual
demand for meat - from  about 9 million tons in the first half of the  1960s to 20 million
tons in  1990  (Shend  1993.  p.  184).  The  USSR  became the  world's largest  importer
of grain and  livestock products  in the 1980s  with total agricultural  imports  exceeding
$20 billion in  1985 and averaging  about $16 billion annually  in the late  1980s (USDA
1989,  p.  40).  It can be said that the Soviets ate half of their petroleum  exports  during
the  1980s,  by using  the  foreign exchange to pay for the  resources  needed  to  meet
the consequences  of livestock product subsidies.  With  a different  policy framework,
the  foreign  exchange  could  have  been  used  to  have  updated  the  machinery  and
technology of important industrial sectors - but it wasn't.
Transition
Unfortunately  much of what needs to be accomplished for a successful  transition  to a
market  economy  in the former  USSR  remains to be done.  There are  variations  from
republic  to  republic,  with  the  Baltics  having  made  the  greatest  progress  but  even
there  much  remains  to  be  done.  There  is  no agreement  on  the future  structure  of
agriculture  - will  the large  units continue to be protected  by  ambiguities  in  property
rights, limitations on the sale of farm land, the lack of a credit system that depends on
land  as collateral, and  by the power of management  to  restrain  farmers  from  taking
the land to which they are entitled?  Until these and other related issues are resolved,
it is  unreasonable to  expect that an  efficient and  low cost  agriculture  will  emerge  in
the near future.
Some major developments  during the transition will be briefly  presented.  I start with
1990  rather than  1991  since  in the  latter year the system  was already winding  down
with  lower output levels in the agricultural  input sector.  We shall consider changes in
production,  livestock inventories, inputs and prices of outputs and inputs.
Output
Between  1990  and  1995  the  output  of  agriculture  in  the  FSU  declined  by
approximately  a  third.  Grain  production  declined  from  an  average  of  196.6  million
tons for 1986-90 to 125.7  million tons in  1995,  but recovered  to  154.3  million tons in
1996 (USDA  1996, p. 33).
It  is  difficult,  even  now,  to  fully  understand  the  magnitude  of  the  adjustments  in
livestock  and  poultry  production  necessitated  primarily  by  the  elimination  of  the
subsidies.  One measure  is found  in  the  large reductions  in  livestock inventories  in
the  FSU  from  1990  through  1995  - 29  percent for  cattle,  43  percent  for  hogs  and
sheep  and  36  percent  for  poultry  (USDA  1996,  p.  20).  Nothing  similar  had  ever
happened  before  except  in  the  destruction  of their livestock by farmers  when  they
were forced to join the collectives in the 1930s.  If such changes  had been  required
of farmers  in  Western  Europe  or  North  American  over such  a short  period  of time,
one could only imagine the political consequences.
While  there  were those who  were concerned  that the removal  of  the food  subsidies
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concern  was  entirely  erroneous.  What  has  happened  was  that  the  farmers  have
borne the entire brunt of the elimination  of the subsidies as well as the adverse  price
effects  of  the  reduction  in  real  consumer  income.  In  Russia  the  retail  prices
increases  of  meat  and  poultry  from  December  1991  to  December  1995  is  fully
consistent with  the view that farmers  bore the full cost of the  elimination  of the  price
subsidies.  The  retail  prices  of  meat  and  poultry  increased  1,420  times  while  the
overall  consumer  price  index increased  by  1,850 times.  Retail  milk prices  behaved
quite differently - from the end of 1991  to the end of 1995  retail  milk prices  increased
by 6,283 times.
The  changes  in  the  farm  prices  of livestock products  in  Russia  from  1991  to  1995
even  more  strongly support the conclusion that farmers  bore the  brunt of the effects
of the  elimination  of the  subsidies.  From  1991  to  1995  the overall  consumer  price
index  increased  by  1,850  times  while  hog  prices  increased  by  1,010  times,  cattle
prices by 530  times  and  milk prices  by 1,005 times  (USDA  1996,  p.  23).  The  milk
producers obviously did not gain from  the increase in the  real retail  price of milk.  The
marketing  margin  for  milk seems  to  have  increased  much  more  than  for beef  and
pork.
There were policy mistakes that served to prolong the livestock inventory  adjustment
process,  thus extending the period during which livestock prices were depressed  and
producers were faced with  large losses and/or low returns.  The  official  reaction  was
that  the  liquidation  of  the  cattle  herds  constituted  a  national  disaster  and  large
subsidies were  introduced  to minimize  liquidation.  There was  no official  recognition
that the immediate  impact of the elimination of the food subsidies was  a sharp fall  in
the  real  prices of livestock.  The process of liquidating the  herds  added  to the  short
run  supply  of  available  product  and  forced  prices  even  lower  than  demand  side
variables  would  have  called for.  The  payment  of  subsidies  only  delayed  the  date
when  livestock production  once again  became profitable.  Until  supply was  reduced
to  the  point  at  which  it  equalled  demand  at  a  profitable  price,  the  market  value  of
meat would  be  one that resulted  in  losses in  producing  livestock  products.  If there
ever were rational grounds for decoupled subsidies, this would have been one.
The level of subsidies were not quite as large for hogs in  1993  and  1994  as for  cattle
(USDA  1996,  p. 6).  However,  as  a percentage of gross revenues the subsidies were
large for both cattle and hogs - 19.8 and  18.8 percent,  respectively in  1993,  and  27.4
and 22.9 percent in 1994.  Both were cut significantly, falling to about 10 percent or a
little less in 1995. The subsidy for milk was  large  in  1993 (25.5 percent)  and  in  1994
(22.8 percent) with a reduction to  11.2 percent in 1995 (USDA 1996, p. 6).
Inputs
While adverse weather has been responsible for part of the output decline, especially
in 1995  in Russia and Kazakstan and in 1996 in the Ukraine, the reduction in fertilizer
and pesticide use has almost certainly begun to have adverse effects on yields.  The
delivery  of chemical  fertilizer  to  farms  in  the  FSU  declined  from  21.6  million  tons
(nutrient  weight)  in  1990  to  6.5  million  tons  in  1994  (USDA  1995,  p. 10)  and  the
decline  continued into 1995.  The reduction exceeds 70 percent.
The  delivery  of pesticides  has  declined  at  least as  much  as fertilizer  and  perhaps
more.  The  yield  reductions have  been  smaller than one  might have  expected  from
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the soil;  other factors  may be  due  to  past excess  use  of fertilizer,  especially  in the
drier regions,  and inappropriate  and untimely application of fertilizer.
The  deliveries  of  new farm  machines  - tractors,  trucks,  combines  - have  fallen  by
more  than  90  percent  since  1990  (OECD  1996,  p.  196).  The  inventory  of  farm
machines has declined,  is declining and will continue to decline  until purchases  equal
the  removals from  the  inventory.  While  up to  the present, the availability  of harvest
machinery apparently has been  sufficient to harvest the crop  in  a reasonable  amount
of time,  if deliveries remain low for two or three more years  harvesting problems  may
arise.
The amount of feed  used to  produce a centner of gain for cattle  and  hogs and for a
centner of milk were  high in  the  USSR  compared  to Westem  Europe  in  the  1980s
(World  Bank 1992,  p.  180).  Unfortunately the available evidence  indicates that in the
large farms feed use  per unit of output has  increased from the  1990 level  - by  more
than 40 percent for cattle and hogs and 20 percent for milk between  1990 and  1994
(USDA  1996,  p.  22).  The deterioration in feed productivity could  be due to reductions
in the supply of calories per animal  unit,  reductions in protein  in the diets and  limited
supplies of animal pharmaceuticals  - probably all three factors have been involved.
Agricultural potential of the FSU
There  are  conflicting  views  about  the  agricultural  potential  of  the  territory  of  the
former  Soviet  Union.  There  are  also  different  views  concerning  the  future  of  the
region  in  international  trade.  Let  me  briefly present  my  relatively  optimistic  views
concerning the future,  especially with respect to trade  in  grain  and  possibly livestock
products.  To  some  degree,  my optimism  with  respect  to  the  trade  in  grain  results
from  the  decline  in  the  demand  for  grain  for  feed  to  meet  the  local  demand  for
livestock and  poultry  products.  When  consumers  have to  pay  prices  for  meat  and
milk  that  will  be  profitable  for  livestock producers,  per  capita  consumption  will  be
substantially below what it was  in the 1980s  even after per capita real  incomes equal
and exceed what was achieved prior to the transition.  It is possible, though unlikely,
that instead of exporting grain, the region  could export livestock products instead but
limitations on the available international markets of meat make this unlikely.
The above has been written  under the assumption that it will  be possible "to  put the
agriculture of the region back together" after the transition  to a  market economy  has
been completed.  In other words, will the dislocations that we have seen and expect
to  see result  in  reducing  the  potential  agricultural  productivity  of the  region  for  the
near  future,  say  over  the  next  quarter  century  or  so?  Under  reasonable  policy
conditions,  I believe  that  the  territory  of  the  FSU  could  regain  and  surpass  the
realized output of crop products that was achieved under the old system.  While the
efficiency of the  production of livestock products was low  in comparison with that  of
Western  Europe,  there  is  no  reason why  this would  be  the case  if there  were  an
effective  market  system  in  place.  It is  known  what  it  takes for  a  cow  to  produce
seven  or  more  tons  of milk per year  or how to  produce  a  pig weighing  nearly  100
kilograms  on  400  kilograms  of  concentrates  in  less  than  five  months.  There  is
absolutely  no reason why this  could  not be  done in the  FSU  if the proper inputs  and
services  were  available.  With  effective  privatization  and  the  return  of  livestock
profitability,  there  should  no  longer  be  an  imbalance  between  overall  feed  supplies
and  the  number  of  animals.  Under  the  old  system,  livestock  feed  rations  were
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seemed  to  have  read Morrison's  Feeds  and  Feedinq or  any  other  guide  to efficient
animal  feeding  practices.  In  a  market  economy  this defect  should  be  remedied  by
increases  in  the  protein  supply  either  through  increased  domestic  production  or
imports.  Until  domestic  supplies  of animal  pharmaceuticals  and  feed  supplements
can be increased,  such products  can and will be imported.  In other words, the  major
sources of low feed productivity can and,  I believe, will be overcome when  agriculture
is really privatized  and a  market system  functions within  a reasonably  liberal  trading
regime.  There  is  no  reason  why  the  farm  people  of  the  FSU  cannot  achieve
approximately the same  levels of feed productivity as farmers  elsewhere  if there  are
both the  incentives and access to the necessary products and  services.  True,  it will
take  time  but  livestock producers  outside  the  region  should  not  be  misled  by  the
current  low levels of feed productivity and assume that they will  persist more  or less
indefinitely.
Contrary  to  general  belief,  grain  productivity  in  the  USSR  compared  favorably  with
that of climatically comparable areas in North America.  It is inappropriate  to compare
average grain yields of the USSR with  average grain yields  of North America.  Where
maize  can  be  grown  economically,  it is  much  higher  yielding  than  wheat,  barley  or
rye. As  Khrushchev  learned,  only a small fraction of the grain area of the USSR was
suited  for  growing  maize  as  grain  and  maize  is  much  more  important  in  North
America  than  it was  in the  USSR.  Consequently  in comparing  yields  as  a basis  for
judging productivity of resource use,  it is best to exclude maize from the comparison.
Quite  some years  ago I compared  the yields of wheat, oats and barley  in  the  USSR
with  climatically  similar  areas  in  North  America.  If adjustment  is  made  for  the
differences  in  the use  of summer  fallow and  if bunker yields  are  converted  to  clean
grain,  average  yields  of grains  in  the  USSR  were  approximately  the  same  as the
average yields of wheat, oats and barley in climatically similar areas in  North America
from  1965 to  1979.
The  USSR  grain yields,  of course,  are  for the  grain  actually  harvested,  not  on  the
amount  of  grain  that  was  available  for  harvest.  Soviet  grain  combines  were
notoriously  inefficient, throwing  a significant amount  of grain  out with  the straw  and
chaff.  The yield of clean grain might well have been  increased by 10 percent - some
would  put  the  figure  significantly higher  than that  - if  their  combines  had  met  the
standards of combines produced  in Western  Europe  or North America.
While  grain  yields  in  similar  climatic  areas  compared  favorably  with  those  in  North
America, the same could not be said for hay and silage yields.  Based on regressions
of hay yields  on grain  yields  in  North American  similar climatic areas,  hay yields  in
the USSR  were only half of what one would  expect given the actual wheat  yields in
the USSR (Johnson and Brooks 1983, pp.  81-82).  Hay was not a priority crop under
the  old system  while  grains were.  Corn  silage yields were  also significantly below
those achieved in North America for similar areas.  There  is a substantial potential for
major increases in hay and silage yields.  If tame hay yields increased by one ton per
hectare,  this  would  increase  the  feed  supply  by  a  minimum  of  15  million  tons  of
concentrates  and  yields  would  still  be  a  third  below  the  potential  yield  based  on
wheat yields  in the FSU.  This improvement  alone, which  would be relatively easy for
truly privatized farms to achieve, would equal  more than  10 percent of the amount  of
concentrates  fed  in  the late 1980s.  Other savings  in  grain due to privatization  would
be reduced  seed use and  reduced waste in  harvesting, transportation  and  processing
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accepted the  very  high  estimates  of waste  in  the  old  system,  the  savings  could  be
substantially  greater  (OECD  1991).  Added  to  the  above  potential  effects  of
privatization  and  other  market  reforms  are  the  effects  of  the  long  run  reduction  in
feed  use of grain  due to the decline in per capita consumption  of livestock products.
Grain  production  depends on both  yield and the area  sown.  The area  sown  to grain
in  the  FSU  has  declined from  115  million  hectares  in  1986-90  to  an  average  of 97
million hectares for 1995 and  1996 (USDA  1996,  p. 33).  The decline  could be due to
several  factors  - the  low  prices  of  grain  for  much  of  the  recent  period,  the
abandonment  of low yielding  land,  an  increase  in  summer  fallow  in  the  drier  areas,
and  the  lack  of  certain  inputs  such  as  fuel,  seeds  and  fertilizers.  The  largest
percentage  reduction in grain  sown  area,  25  percent,  has  been  in  Kazakstan,  which
has had the lowest yields of any of the republics.  In  Kazakstan  the total  sown  area
has declined significantly since 1990 while  in  Russia and the  Ukraine  the  total  sown
area has remained  unchanged  implying that in these republics  the area  not sown  to
grain  has  been  sown  to  something  else  (OECD  1996,  p.  198).  But  this  may  be
reading too much into the somewhat  shaky available data.  Prior to 1991  the regional
prices  paid for grain  did not reflect the costs of transportation  and  marketing;  in fact
grain prices were higher in  Kazakstan than  in the Ukraine even  though the latter was
much closer to the center of the national market.  Now that farm  prices are beginning
to more  nearly reflect real  transport costs,  it is highly probable  that grain  production
will  decline - perhaps  disappear - in  areas  of Kazakstan  and  Western  Siberia.  But
these  are  areas  of low yields with  a  low ratio  of output to  seed  and  the  net output
reduction will  be much  less than  in the area involved.
I  have  estimated  that  the  changes  that  can  be  reasonably  expected  due  to
privatization and  liberalization would change the net grain  trade of the territory  of the
FSU  by  as  much  as  75  to  80  million  tons  annually  (Johnson  1993).  A  significant
share  - nearly half - of the change in trade has already occurred due  to the reduction
in feed  use.
Organization  of Agriculture
The above speculation  assumes that there will emerge  an organization of agriculture
that will  make efficient use of the  human  and  natural  resources  of the  region.  That
organization  has  not yet emerged.  Most  of agricultural  output comes  from  either  of
two  extremes  - the  large  farm  units that  have  succeeded  the  state  and  collective
farms  and  from  private  plot  production  by  both  rural  and  urban  residents.
Independent  private farms  account  for a  relative  modest fraction  of  output  overall  -
perhaps 5 percent of the total.  For a number of important  products - potatoes, fruits
and  vegetables  - the  household  plots  produce  75  percent  or  more  of  total  output
(OECD  1996,  p. 203).  In  Russia,  the  Ukraine  and  Kazakstan,  plot  production
accounts for more  than 40 percent  of production  of milk and  meat  (OECD  1996,  p.
203).  These  distributions are  not  sustainable in the  long  run  as real  labor  earnings
increase.
Why have not more  private family farms  emerged?  It now seems clear that the lack
of  profitability  of  agriculture  due  to  the  slow  adjustment  to  changing  conditions
combined  with the overall  decline in  real  incomes have  inhibited the  development  of
family  farms  or,  for  that  matter,  the  significant  reorganization  of  the  existing  large
farms.  As  profitability  returns  to  agriculture,  as  it must  sooner or  later,  more  family
farms  will  emerge  if the  governments  of the  region  stop providing  subsidies to  large
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enforces the  rights  of individuals to  withdraw  the land  and  other  assets  of the  large
farms that they have been awarded.
But  it  can  be  argued  that other factors  may  be  responsible  for the  failure  of family
farms to emerge.  One is  that there  has not been  a tradition  of individual  farms  in  the
FSU.  Another  is  that  the  workers  on  the  collective  and  state  farms  were  highly
specialized  and few  people  have experience with  the  range  of production  activities
required on a family farm  as well as no experience  in management.  A third reason  is
that there  are  important  interests  in  maintaining  the  existing  farms  over  and  above
the  interests  of  their  management.  Much  remains  to  be  done  to  create  local
governmental  institutions to take over the numerous functions of the large farms  - the
schools,  pensions,  welfare  and  social  functions.  A  large  percentage  of  the  rural
population  is  elderly  and  currently  they  are  dependent  on  the  farms  for  their
incomes,  access  to food  at low  prices,  health facilities, personal  transportation,  and
assistance in a wide variety of day to day activities.  There  is  obvious concern  as  to
how  their  needs  will  be  met  if  the  large  farms  are  broken  into  family  farm  units,
especially for those who are not capable of operating their own farms.
My  own  view is that the  first two factors,  while valid  as  statements  of fact,  are  not
decisive in determining the future of agriculture.  During most of the  1920s there were
individual  farms  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  their  performance  certainly  compares
favorably to that of the collective and state farms that followed.  The majority  of  the
able bodied farm  population  is well enough educated that with  some assistance from
an  extension  service  they  could  quite  readily  learn  to  solve  the  management
problems  of family  farms.  But  the  dependence  of  the  older  farm  people  on  the
existing  farms  is  clearly  a  problem  of great  importance  and  one  that  needs  to  be
addressed  if the  transition to  family farms  is not to  result in  great  distress  for  them.
My  reaction  to  the  view that the  rural  people  cannot  adapt  to  the  requirements  of
family  farming  is  that  this  is  a  demeaning  and  unwarranted  appraisal  of  the
capabilities  of farm  people.  Experience  indicates  that when  farm  people  anywhere
find  themselves  in  a  reasonably  congenial  policy  environment,  they  can  and  do
succeed.  Can the large farm  units survive?  When  I speak of large farm  units  it is in
terms  of  the  number  of workers  not  hectares  of  land.  Farms  of  several  hundred
hectares  may  emerge where  the number of workers  is  small,  say no more  than four
or five.  World experience  indicates that farms that employ  large numbers  of workers
- say  100  or  more  - are  unusual  and  are  restricted  to  certain  plantations or  farms
where  piece  rates  generally  apply  and  there  are  no  restraints  on  hiring  and  firing.
Large livestock producing units have emerged  in the United States but these are very
capital intensive, employ relatively few workers and are dependent on a sophisticated
infrastructure  that  is unlikely to  exist  in  Eastern  Europe  for  several  decades.  The
economies  of  scale  in  grain  production  with  the  capital  intensive  methods  of
production  that have  emerged  in  the  United  States  appear to  be  exhausted  with  a
farm  size employing no more than two full-time workers.
Structure of rural communities
In  the  industrial  market  economies,  agriculture  plays  a  minority  role  in  rural
communities  in providing employment.  With the substitution of capital and purchased
inputs  for  labor  required  to  achieve  a  high  return  on  farm  labor,  the  amount  of
employment that can be provided  by agriculture is simply too small to maintain  viable
rural  communities.  Increasingly,  farms  are  part-time  with  one  or  more  members  of
27the  family working  off the farm,  either  in  the rural  community  or by  commuting  to  a
city. Without such employment  opportunities available to rural  people, the density  of
population would  be too small to  provide the infrastructure needed  for attractive  rural
life.  Such employment  has  been  a  major factor  in bringing  rural  incomes  into  rough
equality with  urban incomes in most industrial economies.
One of the tragedies of the heritage of the FSU  is the limited number of nonfarm jobs
available  in  rural  communities.  The  efforts  that  were  made  to  create  nonfarm
employment  opportunities  in  rural  efforts  bore little fruit.  There  were  many reasons
for  this - the types  of enterprises  created,  the  poor state  of  the  rural  infrastructure,
especially  roads  and  communication,  and  the  prevailing  structure  of  incentives.
Given  the  relatively  low  density  of  population  in  many  rural  areas  it may  be  very
difficult to  attract  nonfarm  employment.  One  source of the  success  of China's  rural
reforms  was  the  high  density  of population  in  most  rural  areas.  This  high  density
provided  easily  accessible  markets,  both  for  farm  products  and  for  the  rapid
development of small  industrial enterprises.
Concluding comments
A great deal  remains to be accomplished before the agriculture  of the  FSU  becomes
productive  and  competitive  in  the  world  economy.  There  remain  numerous  policy
decisions that are  required  to facilitate the  development  of a  market  economy.  For
much  of  the  FSU  liberalization  has  hardly  begun  and  numerous  measures  are
required  before  privatization  can  serve  as  the  basis  for  efficient  land  and  credit
markets.  All  too many restraints remain  on the buying and  selling of  land as well  as
on the removal  of land from the large farms to establish either family  farms or smaller
cooperative  units.  National markets  have not yet  emerged due  to the power of  local
governmental  units to  prohibit  or manage  trade.  The  limited  national  road  network
and poor quality of rural roads constitute a real  barrier to the integration of rural areas
into  the  national  economy.  Added  to  this  array  of  unresolved  issues  is  that
agriculture and rural areas will require an enormous amount  of investment to  create a
modern  productive  agriculture and to transform the  input and processing  sectors into
internationally competitive  industries.  These investments  will  be  slow to  materialize
until  the  economies  achieve  a  relatively  rapid  and  sustained  rate  of  growth  and
agriculture becomes sufficiently profitable to support a  high rate of investment.
While  the  current  outlook  can  be  described  as  gloomy,  if  policies  are  soon  set
reasonably right there is ground for optimism for the future of agriculture and  rural  life
of the FSU.  The freeing  of the energies of a large and  well educated  rural  population
can  bring  forth an  outpouring  of ingenuity and productivity.  Perhaps within the next
decade or so the countryside will flower in a way that the potential  of its human  and
natural resources  has long warranted  but may now for the first time be fully realized.
Let us  hope  that this  will  be  the  outcome.  It is  in no  one's  real  interest  that  it  be
otherwise.
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2.  The same relationship  between the retail prices of meat and  poultry prevailed  at the  end of 1992,
1993  and  1994 compared to December 1991.  By the end  of 1992 the overall consumer price  index
had increased 26 times while the  retail prices of meat and  poultry had increased  by  19 times;  for the
end of 1993 the  increases were  245 times and 229 times.
3.  I frankly do  not understand the sharply different  behavior in the retail  prices for meat and poultry
and  milk.  From  1990 to 1995 the per capita consumption  of meat and poultry declined  by 32 percent
while  milk consumption  declined by 38 percent.  The  price elasticity of demand for milk has to be very
much  smaller than for meat to be consistent with these differences  in  price behavior.
4.  The marketing margin for milk has increased substantially more than  for beef or pork since  1990.
In  1990 the marketing margins for all livestock products were very low, equal to less than  15  percent
of the farm price (World Bank 1992,  p.  212).  The  margins have remained  low,  by the standards of
Western  Europe  or the  United States for beef and  pork, but in 1995 the farm  price of milk was only
0.43 times the retail price implying  a marketing margin  equal to about  130 percent of the farm  price.
5.  An  additional major source of error  in comparing  Soviet and  North American  grain yields resulted
from ignoring the different roles of  summer fallow.  Soviet planners didn't like summer fallow - the
practice of leaving land idle every other year or one year out of three so that it would accumulate
moisture and  nitrogen and  permit more effective control of weeds.  Consequently  the percentage  of
the small grains sown after summer fallow was much smaller in the USSR than  in the  comparable
areas of North America -about  10 percent in the former and approximately 50 percent  in the  latter.
Since grain on summer fallow land outyields that on continuously cropped  land by  50 percent  or
more,  comparing  yields on the land actually sown to grain gives an erroneous impression  of the yield
potential of the  land.  It  is much more  accurate to estimate yields on the total amount of land  devoted
to the grains, including summer fallow and  land actually sown, than to calculate the yield  on the  basis
of sown area alone.  In  1975-79,  for example, the average yield per hectare  sown  area of wheat,  oats
and  barley in the climatically similar areas in  North America was 1.81; when  the summer fallow area
is included, the yield falls to 1.22 tons (Johnson and  Brooks 1983, p.  77). The USSR  yield for the
same  years, cleanweight basis, was 1.29 tons per hectare when summer fallow was included.  Over
the next decade soviet grain yields increased about  16 percent while wheat yields in the  United States
increased 20 percent.  I can see no reasons why future yields in the  FSU could not be comparable to
those  in climatically similar North American  areas.
6.  A chairman of a Ukrainian collective farm  and  an  important govemrnmental  official told me that a
John Deere combine would  harvest one ton per hectare  more than a soviet combine.  This seems
high to me, but a difference  of a half ton  per hectare on wheat that was yielding 3 tons or more per
hectare might be a reasonable estimate.
7. In terms of the implications for trade in grain  and/or livestock products, account needs to be taken
of the reduction in the use of concentrates for production of meat and milk that results from the
reduction in production of these products within the FSU.  The per capita consumption of these
products has fallen by approximately a third and some continuing decline may be anticipated as their
production  returns to profitability.  While per capita consumption will increase as real per capita
incomes grow, the long run  levels of per capita consumption will remain well below those of 1990 until
real  per capita incomes substantially exceed those of the late 1980s.  Even without any improvement
in the productivity of feed, feed use in the FSU  will remain far below that of the  late 1980s.  The
anticipated  improvements  in feed  productivity with privatization  will only  add to the amount  of grain
available  for export as grain  or as livestock products.
8.  The allocation of garden  plots to a significant  percentage  of the  urban population  in  Russia  and the
Ukraine has been  an important factor in  maintaining the food supply at a tolerable level.  The area  of
30the rural household  and garden plots equals nearly 7  percent of the total sown  area  in Russia  and
about 15 percent in the  Ukraine (OECD  1996,  pp. 99 and  198).
9.  The  significant increase in the  average size of full-time farms  in industrial countries that  has
occurred over the past half century has been  due primarily to the change  in factor proportions that
has been  required by the increase  in the real  value of farm  labor.  The higher returns to farm  labor
has required  both overall productivity improvement  in farming  and  increases in the amounts of
capital, including  land, and  purchased  inputs per worker.  Since World War  II  the  rate of growth  of
average output per worker in agriculture has been  higher than for the  nonfarm  part of the economy;
total factor productivity growth  has also been  higher in  agriculture (Johnson  1997).
31